AS FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON MAY 19, 2003
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                                  UNITED STATES
                       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
                             Washington, D.C. 20549

                            SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION
                    PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a)
                     OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
                               (AMENDMENT NO. __)

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                              HERCULES INCORPORATED
                (Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)

               HERCULES SHAREHOLDERS' COMMITTEE FOR NEW MANAGEMENT
    (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

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             THE HERCULES SHAREHOLDERS' COMMITTEE FOR NEW MANAGEMENT
                       17 State Street, New York, NY 10004

                                                                    May 19, 2003

Dear Hercules Employee Plan Participant:

         While we will also  communicate  with you  through  our  letters to all
Hercules  shareholders,  we are writing to you separately as Hercules  employees
and  retirees,  as well as owners,  in order to address  questions  you may have
regarding  the  Committee  and its plans as they might  impact the future of our
Company and yourselves.

(1)      Our four minority  directors have been advocates of a pro-growth policy
         at Hercules.  You should know that we opposed the sale of  BetzDearborn
         because of the fact that  attractive  refinancing of the Company's debt
         was available at the time without the necessity of asset sales,  and we
         believed  that Dr.  Joyce and the  majority  directors  were  selling a
         promising  business  at the  worst  possible  time.  While it is public
         knowledge  that for much of the last three years the Company has sought
         to sell itself,  in whole or in part,  beginning  shortly  after taking
         their  seats on the Board in June 2001,  our  minority  directors  have
         advocated  "taking the for sale signs down" and  focusing on the growth
         of our businesses.

         While as major Hercules  shareholders we would always support a sale of
         the Company at an attractive  price, we have long held the view that it
         was unlikely  that the Company could be sold during this period of time
         at a price  attractive  to  shareholders.  As a result,  we  accurately
         predicted  that the  pursuit  of "wild  goose  chases" by Joyce and his
         predecessor would needlessly  divert  management  attention and focus -
         jeopardizing  the morale of our  employees,  the value of our  business
         franchises, and indeed the whole fabric of our Company.

(2)      Although we have been largely  supportive of management's  cost cutting
         program,  it is axiomatic that businesses cannot "cost cut their way to
         prosperity" and that successful turnaround strategies can never rely on
         cost reduction  alone.  Unfortunately,  management's  almost  exclusive
         preoccupation has been on cost reduction.  But dynamic leadership isn't
         just about cutting  costs or staying  afloat.  Given the  experience of
         members of our Committee in the specialty chemicals industry,  we would
         place the very  highest  priority  on  avoiding  the  commodization  of
         Hercules'  businesses.  In so doing,  we would  focus on new  products,
         acquisitions,  expanded field  technical  services,  new alliances with
         other  manufacturers  to  add  complementary  products,  and a  pricing
         strategy which emphasizes profitability rather than modest market share
         gains.

(3)      We could not be more opposed to the outrageous  compensation  practices
         at the Company, pursuant to which a succession of failed CEOs and other
         senior executives are awarded  multi-million  dollar golden parachutes,
         bonuses,  and  severance  packages.  While  Joyce  will have been paid,
         should our nominees prevail in the proxy contest, more than $25 million
         for his two years on the job,




         many Hercules  employees have at the same time been laid off, had their
         salaries  frozen,  or  received  skimpy  increases.   Moreover,   under
         management's "pay for non-performance" philosophy, compensation appears
         to  bear  no  relationship  to  individual,   Company,  or  shareholder
         performance.  Earlier this year, for example, Joyce was awarded a bonus
         of $1.9 million while other top executives  received another $8 million
         --  following a year in which the Company  registered  a loss of almost
         $250  million  (excluding a $360 million  write-down  of goodwill)  and
         Hercules  shareholders  lost  approximately  $400 million in the market
         value of their  investments  in the 12 month  period prior to the bonus
         awards.

         Just  recently,  at an April  17th  Board  meeting,  the Board took the
         outrageous action to authorize a grant of 750,000  restricted shares of
         Hercules  stock to 137 Company  executives  at a cost to the Company of
         $7-1/2  million  -- which  grant  will fully vest in the event that the
         Committee's  nominees  are elected at this year's  Annual  Meeting!  In
         addition to the 750,000 share grant, the Board's Compensation Committee
         proposed  that  Joyce be given a grant  of  211,000-500,000  restricted
         shares  (depending  upon the price of Hercules stock at the time of the
         "change in  control").  Assuming the  Company's  current stock price of
         $10.02 per share,  as of the close of business  on May 16,  Joyce would
         receive  300,000  shares  - at a cost to the  Company  of more  than $3
         million.  Based upon a schedule where the amount of the grant increases
         with the price of Hercules  stock,  should the Hercules stock price, by
         way of  illustration,  exceed $12 per share at the time of a "change in
         control,"  Joyce  would  receive  500,000  shares -- worth more than $6
         million.

         You should know that in  discussions  with the  Compensation  Committee
         prior to the Board meeting,  Joyce had insisted on an even larger grant
         than the one the  Committee  proposed.  Only after the objection of our
         minority  directors  and  the  acknowledgement  by one of the  majority
         directors  that the  proposed  course of action would not "read well on
         the front page of The Wall  Street  Journal,"  did the Board  decide to
         defer action on Joyce's  grant until a Board meeting to be scheduled in
         the near future.

(4)      On the  subject  of  employee  benefits,  we,  as well as the  majority
         directors,  have  agreed  that the  Company's  pension  obligations  to
         retirees  and  pension  benefits  for  actives  must be  preserved  and
         safeguarded. Where we disagree with the majority directors, however, is
         that we believe  that the  Hercules  pension  plans have been  terribly
         mismanaged, resulting in last year's $570 million pension fiasco. As we
         outline in our Proxy  Statement,  we favor reducing the risk profile of
         the pension  plan  investments  --  believing  that this not only makes
         sound  business  sense,  but that it will  have  the  added  affect  of
         allaying the concerns of Hercules employees and retirees for the safety
         of their pensions.

         With  respect  to health  and  medical  benefits,  while  all  Hercules
         directors  regret  having had to make such a move because of its impact
         on our  employees,  both majority and minority  directors have approved
         cost  reductions  in health and


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         medical  programs in keeping with what  hundreds of other  companies in
         corporate America have already done.

(5)      In response to misconceptions regarding members of our Committee, which
         management has attempted to foster by innuendo,  you should be aware of
         the following FACTS:

         Mr.  Heyman  (together  with Mr.  Kumar with respect to Dexter and Life
         Technologies) has been involved as a shareholder  activist with respect
         to five  public  companies,  helping to create  more than $7 billion of
         increased  wealth  for  ALL   shareholders  of  those   companies,   as
         illustrated below:1



                                                                        Realized Value
                                     Time                                per Share for
                                    Period                 Initial        all Subject                   Stockholder
                          (initial purchase - value          Cost           Company       Percentage   Value Created
       Company                   realization)             Per Share     Shareholders2      Increase      (rounded)
----------------------- ------------------------------- --------------- ---------------- ------------- ---------------

                                                                                     
GAF                               1981-1989                 $ 6.50          $53.00           715%      $ 1.6 billion

Union Carbide                     1984-1985                 $43.63          $85.00           95%       $ 2.9 billion

Borg-Warner                       1986-1987                 $29.15          $48.50           66%       $ 1.7 billion

Dexter                            1998-2000                 $25.18          $62.50           148%      $   .9 billion

Life Technologies                 1998-2000                 $35.80          $60.00           68%       $   .2 billion
                                                                                                       ---------------

                                                                     Total Shareholder Value Created:  $  7.3 billion
                                                                                                       ===============


         While these  efforts have resulted in  substantial  profits for GAF and
         ISP, for which we trust we need make no apology,  they have created far
         more  wealth for other  public  shareholders  of these five  companies.
         Moreover,  neither Mr.  Heyman nor any of his  companies or  associates
         have ever taken "greenmail".  In fact, Mr. Heyman has been a leader for
         more than 20 years in efforts to improve corporate governance practices
         in  Corporate  America  and has  consistently  taken  public  positions
         strongly criticizing greenmail.

*        *        *       *        *        *        *        *       *        *

         We remain convinced that there are still substantial  underlying values
at Hercules and that the Company's two remaining,  primary  businesses,  Aqualon
and

----------
     1  There is, of course, no assurance that either the efforts of the
        Committee or Mr. Heyman will result in similar benefits for Hercules
        shareholders.

     2  GAF was acquired by Mr. Heyman and a management group in 1989 at $53 per
        share. Union Carbide implemented a recapitalization of its own in
        response to GAF's premium bid for the Company that resulted in a market
        value immediately thereafter of $85 per share. Borg Warner, Dexter and
        Life Technologies were acquired by third parties after GAF or ISP made
        premium offers for those companies.



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the pulp and paper businesses,  are not only extremely attractive but, under the
right direction,  have substantial  potential for growth. Should the Committee's
nominees  be  elected  at the  Annual  Meeting  this  year,  we will  recruit an
outstanding  Chief  Executive  who  will  not  only  be  committed  to  creating
shareholder  value  but  focused  on the  long-term  health  and  growth  of the
Company's businesses.

         If you are as dissatisfied as we are with the disastrous performance of
the Company and its stock price and are as concerned  as we are about  Hercules'
future  direction,  we urge you to support our efforts on behalf of ALL Hercules
shareholders.

         We estimate that  approximately 7% of the Company's  outstanding shares
are owned by current Hercules employees and retirees.  Your vote is all the more
important because of the Company's  director election Bylaw,  which the majority
directors  claim requires an affirmative  vote of a majority of ALL  outstanding
shares to unseat an  incumbent  director.  This means in effect  that a vote not
cast is the  equivalent of a vote for the Hercules  nominees.  Regardless of the
number of shares you own, we urge, in your own best  interest,  that you support
our shareholder nominees for election as Hercules directors.

         Please note that Hercules' employee plan participants can be assured of
the confidentiality of their votes, as shares voted by plan participants will be
counted  by  an   independent,   third  party  proxy  tabulator  on  a  strictly
confidential  basis.  Furthermore,  you  should  know  that it is  unlawful  for
Hercules or its management to discriminate against you in any way because of how
you vote under an employee plan.

         Joyce and the  Hercules  Board  have  refused  as of this date to set a
record  date for,  and  schedule,  the  annual  meeting.  we are  therefore  not
currently  in a position to solicit  your proxy but intend to do so shortly.  In
the  meantime,  if you have any  questions,  please call  Georgeson  Shareholder
Communications Inc., our proxy solicitation agent, toll-free, at 1-866-288-2190.

                                   Sincerely,

             THE HERCULES SHAREHOLDERS' COMMITTEE FOR NEW MANAGEMENT



                                                             
/s/ Samuel J. Heyman    /s/ Harry Fields    /s/ Anthony T. Kronman    /s/ Sunil Kumar
--------------------    ----------------    ----------------------    ---------------
Samuel J. Heyman        Harry Fields        Anthony T. Kronman        Sunil Kumar


/s/ Gloria Schaffer     /s/ Vincent Tese    /s/ Raymond S. Troubh     /s/ Gerald Tsai, Jr.
-------------------     ----------------    ---------------------     --------------------
Gloria Schaffer          Vincent Tese         Raymond S. Troubh       Gerald Tsai, Jr.




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                             ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

International  Specialty  Products  Inc.,  Samuel J. Heyman,  Raymond S. Troubh,
Sunil Kumar, Gloria Schaffer, Harry Fields, Anthony T. Kronman, Vincent Tese and
Gerald Tsai,  Jr. and certain  other persons may be deemed  participants  in the
solicitation  of  proxies  from  the   shareholders  of  Hercules   Incorporated
("Hercules")  in connection  with Hercules' 2003 Annual Meeting of  Shareholders
Information   concerning   such   participants  is  available  in  the  Hercules
Shareholders'   Committee  for  New  Management's  (the   "Committee")   revised
preliminary proxy statement on Schedule 14A (the "Preliminary  Proxy Statement")
filed by the Committee with the Securities and Exchange  Commission  (the "SEC")
on May 15, 2003.

SHAREHOLDERS  OF HERCULES ARE ADVISED TO READ THE COMMITTEE'S  DEFINITIVE  PROXY
STATEMENT (THE "DEFINITIVE  PROXY STATEMENT") IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMMITTEE'S
SOLICITATION OF PROXIES FROM HERCULES  SHAREHOLDERS  WHEN IT BECOMES  AVAILABLE,
BECAUSE IT WILL  CONTAIN  IMPORTANT  INFORMATION.  Shareholders  of Hercules and
other interested parties may obtain,  free of charge,  copies of the Preliminary
Proxy  Statement and the Definitive  Proxy  Statement  (when  available) and any
other  documents  filed by the  Committee  with the SEC,  at the SEC's  Internet
website at www.sec.gov. The Preliminary Proxy Statement and the Definitive Proxy
Statement  (when  available) and these other documents may also be obtained free
of charge by contacting  Georgeson  Shareholder  Communications  Inc.,  the firm
assisting  the  Committee  in  the   solicitation   of  proxies,   toll-free  at
1-866-288-2190.