CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC Form DEFA14A November 06, 2012

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

(Amendment No.)

Filed by the Registrant x Filed by a party other than the Registrant "

Check the appropriate box:

- " Preliminary Proxy Statement
- " Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
- " Definitive Proxy Statement
- x Definitive Additional Materials
- " Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.

(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

 $(Name\ of\ Person(s)\ Filing\ Proxy\ Statement,\ if\ other\ than\ the\ Registrant)$

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

- x No fee required.
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	(2)	Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
	(3)	Filing Party:
	(4)	Date Filed:

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (the Company) used the following investor presentation in meetings beginning on November 5, 2012, after 4:30 p.m. Central Time. This investor presentation was also posted to the Proxy Contest section of the Company s Investor Relations website, investor.crackerbarrel.com.

On the Right Track, Generating Exceptional Performance Fall 2012

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BOARD



IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (the Company) urges caution in considering current trends and earnings guidance di in this presentation. Except for specific historical information, matters discussed in this presentation are forward looking state that involve risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results and performance of the Company to differ mate from those expressed or implied in this discussion. All forward-looking information is provided pursuant to the safe harbor established under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

More detailed information on risks, uncertainties, and other factors is provided in the Company s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, press releases and other communications.

Cracker Barrel, its directors and certain of its executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders in connection with the matters to be considered at Cracker Barrel s 2012 Annual Meeting. October 4, 2012, Cracker Barrel filed a definitive proxy statement (as it may be amended, the Proxy Statement) with the U.Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in connection with any such solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders.

INVESTORS

AND

SHAREHOLDERS

ARE

STRONGLY

ENCOURAGED

TO

READ

THE

PROXY

STATEMENT

AND

ACCOMPANYING PROXY CARD AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC CAREFULLY AND IN THEIR WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE AS THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Detailed information identity

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participants,

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interests,

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Proxy Statement, including Annex A thereto. Shareholders can obtain the Proxy Statement, any amendments or supplements to the Proxy Statement and other documents filed by Cracker Barrel with the SEC for no charge at the SEC s website at www.sec.gov. Copies will also be available at no charge at the Investor Relations section of our corporate website at www.crackerbarrel.com.

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Executive Summary
II.
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III.

Driving Best-in-Class Results

IV.

Why We Believe Sardar Biglari is Wrong for This Board Appendix Table of Contents



I. Executive Summary

4 Improve same store sales and traffic trends Accelerating same store sales growth in last three quarters with Q4 traffic up 1.4% Cut costs and leverage fixed

costs to enhance profitability

FY 2012 operating margin growth of 50 bps Reconfigure the Board with new members bringing a fresh perspective 7 new board members including a new independent Chairman Fill in key management positions to enhance functional capabilities Revitalized leadership five senior executives new to Cracker Barrel or serving in new positions since January 2011 Develop a long-term plan to maintain operating momentum Same store sales outperforming casual dining peers in Knapp-Track for three consecutive quarters WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE PAST YEAR Delivering on the Company s Promises (1) Changes to board since 20-Jun-2011. As announced on 6-Aug-2012, to be effective following Michael A. Woodhouse s retirement in early November 2012.

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CBRL STOCK PRICE HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY

Since Announcement of Our Strategic Priorities We Have Delivered

Outstanding Shareholder Returns

Source: Bloomberg, public filings, Company press releases, and IBES

Note: 12-Sep-2011; is closing price the day prior to announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011. Please see Appendi GAAP basis operating results to adjusted non-GAAP operating results.

(1) Figure used for comparability to IBES estimates is GAAP basis, earnings per diluted share of \$1.47. When adjusted for the in FY 12 and certain charges in the current and prior year, adjusted earnings per diluted share were \$1.20. \$30 \$40 \$50 \$60 \$70 Sep-2011 Nov-2011 Jan-2012 Mar-2012 May-2012 Jul-2012 Sep-2012 Daily from 12-Sep-2011 to 28 -Sep-2012 22-Nov-2011 CBRL reports 1Q12 EPS of \$1.09 excl. proxy costs, 4.8% higher than analyst expectations 20-Dec-2011 A majority of shareholders vote for CBRL's slate of directors 22-May-2012 CBRL reports 3Q12 EPS of \$0.86 excl. proxy costs, 16.2% higher than analyst expectations \$39.86 \$67.11 19-Sep-2012 CBRL reports 4Q12 EPS of \$1.47, 13.1% higher than analyst expectations 26-Apr-2012 CBRL hosts Analyst and Investor Day reviewing strategic initiatives 21-Feb-2012 CBRL reports 2Q12 EPS of \$1.20 excl. proxy costs, 5.3% higher than analyst expectations 13-Sep-2011 New CEO Sandy Cochran announces

strategic priorities

68.4% INCREASE

```
6
Since December 2011 Proxy Vote
2
Since Announcement of Our Strategic Priorities
1
CBRL HAS SIGNIFICANTLY OUTPERFORMED ITS PEERS
No Matter What Benchmark You Use, CBRL Has Outperformed
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Source: Bloomberg Cracker Barrel Peer Set

S&P 500 Index

Note: Peer set includes

S&P 500 Restaurant Index S&P 600 Restaurant Index S&P 1500 Restaurant Index

BH,
BOBE,
EAT,
CAKE,
DRI,
DENN,
RT,
TXRH.
S&P
Restaurant
Index
includes
the
restaurant
companies
in
the
S&P
500
Index:
CMG,
DRI,
MCD,
SBUX, YUM. S&P 600 Restaurant Index includes the restaurant companies in the S&P 600 Index: BJRI, BH, BWLD, CEC,
RUTH, SONC, TXRH. S&P 1,500 Restaurant Index includes the restaurant companies in the S&P 1,500 Index: BJRI, BH, B
DIN, JACK, MCD, PNRA, PZZA, PEET, RRGB, RT, RUTH, SONC, SBUX, TXRH, WEN, YUM.
(1)
12-Sep-2011; is closing price the day prior to announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011.

20-Dec-2011; date of CBRL s 2011 Annual General Meeting, proxies voted.

7 OUR SHAREHOLDERS HAVE BENEFITED FROM OUR PERFORMANCE AND RETURN OF CAPITAL POLICIES (\$ in millions)

Source: Public filings and Bloomberg

Note: 12-Sep-2011; is closing price the day prior to announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011.

\$ 663.5

\$22.4

\$915.8

\$14.9

\$1,616.6

CBRL Equity

Market Cap.

Total

Shareholder

Value

12-Sep-2011

Increase in

CBRL Equity

Market Cap.

28-Sep-2012

Increase in

CBRL Equity

Market Cap.

= \$700.7

FY 2012

Dividends Paid

FY 2012

Shares Repurchased

28-Sep-2012

8

WE BELIEVE THIS VALUE CREATION RESULTS FROM SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF OUR STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

Source: Public filings

Note: Announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011.

Q4 2011 Q1 2012

Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 Comparable Restaurant Traffic (4.2)%(3.8)%1.1 % 0.6 % 1.4 % Average Check 2.8 % 2.2 % 2.4 % 2.5 % 2.4 % Comparable Restaurant Sales (1.4)%(1.6)%3.5 % 3.1 % 3.8 % Comparable Retail Sales (0.7)%(1.3)%3.4 % 0.3 % 3.1% Our Customers Have Responded to Focus on Menu, Marketing, and Execution Announcement

of Our Strategic

Priorities

C

WHY WE ARE HERE AGAIN

Despite losing by a significant margin in last year's proxy fight, Sardar Biglari remains inexplicably insistent in his campaign against Cracker Barrel. Why do we say inexplicably?

Because of all we accomplished over the past year


What would Biglari have done differently?

We don t know he hasn t raised specific new ideas or suggestions to management or the Board, despite having many opportunities to do so We believe Sardar Biglari has a conflict of interest, history of creeping control that is not in the best interest of shareholders, and a questionable track record on corporate governance Despite being offered two independent seats (for the second year), he turned the offer down

Biglari refuses to consider any settlement offer unless he is personally appointed to the Board

Our shareholders determined he was not right for the Board last year

We agreed and believe he is not right for the Board this year either This discussion should be about the business and who s got it on the right path



II. Delivering on our Six Priorities

11 New marketing messaging Reinforce Authentic Value Refined menu and pricing Increase Variety & Everyday Affordability Enhanced restaurant operating platform

Sustainably Improve the Guest Experience Innovative tactics driving retail sales growth Deliver Value & Connection With the **Brand** Focused cost reduction Offset Commodity Pressures and Other Costs Balanced approach to capital allocation Enhance Shareholder Value WHAT WE TOLD YOU WE D DO 12 MONTHS AGO 1 2 3 4 5 6 **Key Priorities**

Objectives

12 (4.2%)

(3.8%)

1.1%

0.6%

1.4%

Q4

Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 NEW MARKETING MESSAGE Hand Crafted by Cracker Barrel Source: Public filings Launched national cable advertising for the first time, focusing brand building during the busiest seasons (Q2 & Q4) Utilized radio advertising to promote products and value Leveraged billboards to support travel business Hired new advertising agency Havas Worldwide (formerly known as Euro RSCG Worldwide) Continued Investment in Billboards First National Television Campaign Comparable Restaurant Traffic

2011

REFINE MENU AND PRICING

Guest

Satisfaction

Results

Show

Overall

Value

Scores

at

Historic

Highs

2

Better-

For-You

Daily

Lunch

Specials

Highlighted an attractive \$5.99 price point

Drove week-day lunch traffic

Reinforced value perception across all day-parts

13

Launched salad refresh as part of the summer seasonal promotion

Feature salad, including dressing and crackers, under 600 calories

Exceeded expectations for mix and guest satisfaction

14

During the year, received all-time company high scores in nine categories on the guest feedback program

For the second year in a row we have received top honors in the family dining segment of the Consumer Picks survey

conducted for Nation s Restaurant News magazine Past Year s Focus on Guest Experience Has Driven Significant Improvements to Guest Satisfaction **Overall Satisfaction** Intent to Recommend Overall Value ENHANCE RESTAURANT OPERATING PLATFORM July-2011 July-2012 69.7% 70.6% July-2011 July-2012 70.0% 71.0% July-2011 July-2012 59.1% 61.1% Rankı Chain Score² Cracker Barrel Restaurant and Old Country Store 70.3% 2 Marie Callender's 3 62.1 **Bob Evans Restaurants** 61.2 The Original Pancake House 3 59.7 5 **IHOP** 53.5 Steak N Shake 52.1 Village Inn 51.9

Perkins Restaurant & Bakery 51.5 9 Big Boy 50.2 10 Friendly s Ice Cream 47.5 11 Shoney s 45.5 12 Huddle House 44.8 13 Denny s 43.9 14 Waffle House 41.4 (1) Source: Nation's Restaurant News and WD Partners, 2012 Consumer Picks family dining segment survey.

- (2) Weighted by attribute importance.
- (3) 100-149 responses.

3

15
INNOVATIVE TACTICS DRIVING RETAIL SALES GROWTH
Game Plan for Growing Retail Sales
Source: Public filings
Quarterly Retail Same Store Sales
4
Merchandising

Strategy Support the restaurant by reinforcing the emotional connection to the Brand Be a destination retailer for specific occasions and drive traffic for the restaurant Unique Nostalgic Seasonal Everyday Needs (0.7)%(1.3)% 3.4% 0.3% 3.1% Q4 2011 Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012

April-2012: Appointed new SVP of

Retail, Laura Daily

16
FOCUSED COST REDUCTION
5
Improving Productivity of the Box
Eliminating Annual G&A and Labor Expenses
April-2012: Realigned field leadership
July-2011: Restructured home office

Labor Management System Improves direction of weekly training, productivity, and execution Hourly wage expense down 50bps in Q4 2012 Transportation Management System Improves efficiency in the distribution of retail merchandise Improved Technology Streamlined Supply Chain and Purchasing Increasing Labor Productivity Enhanced Operating Systems Leveraging Our Support Cost Base Source: Public filings (1) Adjusted for 53 week in FY 12, proxy contest expenses, severance and restructuring charges. Please see Appendix for reconciliation of GAAP basis operating results to adjusted non-GAAP operating

results.

Margin and Process Improvement Adjusted EPS & Operating Inc as % of Sales 1

17

BALANCED APPROACH TO CAPITAL ALLOCATION

Source: Bloomberg and public filings Note: Market data as of 28-Sep-2012.

- (1) Calculated as latest annualized latest dividend per share divided by last twelve months reported diluted earnings per share earnings per share and / or diluted earnings per share from continuing operations used as disclosed.
- (2) Adjusted

for 53 rdweek in FY 12, proxy contest expenses, severance and restructuring charges. Please see Appendix for reconciliation of GAAP basis operating results to adjusted non-GAAP operating results. (3) CAKE not adjusted for impact of 53 rd week in FY 11 due to lack of disclosure. Dividend Yield Dividend Payout Ratio 1 2.1 % 3.0 % 3.6 % 2.8 % 2.3 % 2.1 % 1.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 %

0.0~%

One **CBRL** DRI **BOBE EAT TXRH CAKE** BH**DENN** RTPeer Median: 1.7% 20.5 % 46.1 % 54.6 % 45.6 % 40.8 % 38.3 % 27.6 % 0.0~%0.0 % 0.0 % CBRL -One **CBRL** DRI **BOBE** EAT **TXRH CAKE** BH**DENN** RTPeer Median: 32.9% 3 Year Ago Year Ago

CBRL -



III. Driving Best-in-Class Results

19
Sales Growth
~5%
Operating Income Growth
~8-10%
Earnings Per Share Growth
~12-15%

Total Shareholder Return

~15-18%

Decisive Action Driving

Total Shareholder

Return

BUILDING ON OUR RECENT SUCCESS

Continued focus on six business priorities

Focus on increasing average unit volume in existing stores

Increase retail sales with unique and nostalgic merchandise

Drive increased profitability in existing locations

Continued commitment to profitable new unit growth

Allocate capital in a way to maximize value

New store growth: 2-3% / per year; focus on most profitable growth, best locations, and flawless execution

Extend the power of the brand beyond the physical store

Long term value creation through e-commerce & development of branded products platform

Focus on Operational Excellence in Existing Units AND

Profitable New Restaurant Growth

2012

2015 Strategic Plan

20
ACCELERATION OF COMPARABLE RESTAURANT SAME STORE SALES VS. KNAPP-TRACK
Three
Consecutive
Knapp-Track
Beats

FY 2012 Source: Public filings and Knapp-Track Note: Knapp-Track Casual Dining Index Comparable Sales figure isan approximation based on respective weekly averages. Cracker Barrel vs. Knapp-Track (2.5)%1.3% 2.1% 3.5% (1.6)%3.5 % 3.1 % 3.8 % 0.9 % 2.2 % 1.0 % 0.3 % First Quarter Second Quarter Third Quarter Fourth Quarter Cracker Barrel Comparable Restaurant Sales Knapp-Track TM Casual Dining Index Comparable Sales

in

21

A SECTOR LEADER IN TOTAL SHAREHOLDER RETURN

TSR Since Announcement of our Strategic Priorities

1

Source: Bloomberg and public filings

Note: Total Shareholder Return calculated by share price appreciation and dividends paid (assumes dividends paid are re-inve (purchasing more shares) on the ex-date of the dividend) over the past year.

(1) 12-Sep-2011; is closing price the day prior to announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011.

Refresh Select Menu Categories
Reinforce value proposition for guests with a refresh of Country Dinner Plates
Introduce better-for-you programs, including new sides and Wholesome Fixins
Grow Retail Sales with Unique

Merchandise Focus on unique, exclusive, authentic merchandise Improve productivity with visual merchandising and space planning Build on Successful Handcrafted Marketing Campaign Continue national media strategy Introduce new Hand-crafted creative advertisements for TV, radio, and billboards Invest in and Leverage Technology to Support Operations and Reduce Costs Implement technology to improve efficiencies and food quality Streamline processes to increase labor productivity Focus on Maximizing Shareholder Returns

Target 2

-3% annual new unit growth over the

next three years

Pay competitive dividends and repurchase shares

Improve E-commerce Business and Develop Branded Products

Platform

Grow e-commerce awareness and revenues

Lay groundwork to sell Cracker Barrel branded

products in grocery stores

UPDATED BUSINESS PRIORITIES TO CONTINUE DRIVING

PERFORMANCE THROUGH 2013

Key Priorities

Objectives

1

1

2

4

5

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A RENEWED BOARD HELPING TO DRIVE PERFORMANCE

Note: Represents board changes as implemented or announced. Represents Board members standing for election at Cracker E Shareholder Meeting.

(1) As announced on 6-Aug-2012, to be effective following Michael A. Woodhouse s retirement in early November 2012. Independent

New Within Past 18 Months

Tom Barr, Vice President, Global Coffee, at Starbucks Coffee Company
Sandy
Cochran,
President
and
CEO,
Cracker
Barrel
and
former
CEO,
Books-A-Million
James Bradford, Dean of Vanderbilt s Owen Graduate School of Management and former President and
CEO
of
AFG
Industries,
Inc.;
Designated
Independent
Chairman
of
the
Board
of
Cracker
Barrel
1
Glenn Davenport, Retired Chairman and CEO, Morrison Management Specialists
Norman Johnson, Executive Chairman and Former CEO, CLARCOR Inc.
William
McCarten,
Chairman
of
the
Board,
DiamondRock
Hospitality
Company
and
former
President
and
CEO, HMS Host Corporation
Coleman
Peterson,
President
and
CEO,
Hollis

Enterprises,
LLC
and
former
EVP
and
Chief
People
Officer,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Richard
Dobkin,
retired
Managing
Partner
of
the
Tampa,
FL The state of th
office
of
Ernst
&
Young
Martha Mitchell, retired Senior Partner and SVP, Fleichman-Hillard, International Communications

Andrea Weiss, President and CEO, Retail Consulting and former Chairman, Cortefiel Group

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ANALYSTS CONTINUE TO COMMENT FAVORABLY ON THE STRATEGY PUT FORTH BY THE INCUMBENT BOARD AND NEW MANAGEMENT

Selected Analyst Commentary

Source: Publicly available equity research reports, permission to use quotations neither sought nor obtained

In our

view, **CBRL** is generating positive growth in traffic not just comps thanks to its effective communication of its revamped value strategy and we expect sales momentum to continue. At the same time, management continues to hone the efficiency of operations which we argue isa key ingredient of CBRL s earnings power and

we anticipate this, in conjunction with positive sales and traffic growth, will offset the effect of higher food costs in the next 12 months. Stephen Anderson, Miller Tabak; 19-Sep-2012 We credit management s outreach to local customers which account for about 60% of CBRL s customer base with sustained same-restaurant sales gains. Specifically,

we think

management s barbell strategy of appealing to value customers (e.g., \$5.99 lunch entrées) and customers seeking non-traditional menu options (e.g., seasonal and better for you menu items) with helping **CBRL** boost both sales and traffic. Stephen Anderson, Miller Tabak; 19-Sep-2012 Since taking the CEO reigns (sic) in 2011, Sandy Cochran identified several enhancements

that

have

improved

CBRL

same-

restaurant

sales

(SRS)

and

traffic

trend

we

believe

the

impact

of

these

changes

will

continue

benefiting

SRS

and

traffic.

In

addition,

the

Company

has

identified

\$30

million-\$45

million

in

cumulative

cost

savings

that

should

be

realized

by

year-end

FY15,

contributing

roughly

100

bps

to

EBIT

margin

improvement during the next three years Lastly, management appears receptive returning more capital shareholders in terms of dividends and share repurchases. Christopher O'Cull, KeyBanc Capital Markets; 12-Jul-2012 Under the leadership of CEO Sandy Cochran management has taken increasingly proactive steps to enhance its core and iconic Old Country Store brand; refine

and

increase the relevancy of its food, service and retail products; and improve the marketing of its concept to a broadened consumer marketplace. Bob Derrington, Northcoast Research; 28-Jun-2012

IV. Why We Believe Sardar Biglari is Wrong for This Board

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WHY WE BELIEVE SARDAR BIGLARI IS STILL WRONG FOR THIS BOARD

New Cracker Barrel CEO and reconfigured Board laid out a new plan and are successfully executing that plan

we believe Biglari would be disruptive to current business momentum

We believe

Biglari s presence on our **Board** would create conflict of interest he is the **CEO** of a family restaurant chain and CEO of a restaurant acquisition vehicle We believe Biglari would want to be operationally involved but has failed to disclose his specific plans or agenda for the business, either to management or directly to the Board His repeated public pronouncements highlight his combative approach was offered two independent board seats for representation (twice) but turned BOTH offers down Biglari has a history of creeping control that we believe is not in the best interest of shareholders: took control of Steak n Shake over time without paying a premium We believe Biglari has a questionable track record on corporate governance: still proposing dual class

of high vote / low vote stock at Biglari Holdings and proposed excessive compensation for himself at Biglari Holdings which received negative shareholder and ISS responses

Biglari Holdings just agreed to pay a \$850,000 civil penalty to resolve a Federal Trade Commission complaint for failing to comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in amassing its initial position in Cracker Barrel

a violation the FTC s Chairman characterized as trying to abuse the law s passive investor exemption

27 Nominee ISS Recommendation Glass Lewis Recommendation Sardar Biglari Philip Cooley PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS AGREE

VOTE THE WHITE

PROXY CARD

Source: ISS Proxy Advisory Services report (Institutional Shareholder Services) and Proxy Paper report (Glass, Lewis & Co.)

Nov-2012

Note: Permission to use information neither sought nor obtained.

Our Board Was Fully Recommended on 2-Nov By ISS and Glass Lewis

Biglari Holdings Nominees

FOR

FOR FOR

FOR

FOR

FOR

Tom Barr

James Bradford

Sandy Cochran

Glenn Davenport

Richard Dobkin

Norman Johnson

William McCarten

Martha Mitchell

Coleman Peterson

Andrea Weiss

Glass Lewis Recommendation

ISS Recommendation

Nominee

Management Nominees

DO NOT VOTE

DO NOT VOTE

DO NOT VOTE

DO NOT VOTE

28
PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS AGREE
VOTE THE WHITE
PROXY CARD
Selected Commenters from ISS

Selected Commentary from ISS

Source: ISS Proxy Advisory Services report (Institutional Shareholder Services) dated 2-Nov-2012

Note: Permission to use quotations neither sought nor obtained.

Emphasis added. As the most compelling explanation of the company s resurgence is the leadership change and execution on the new strategic plan by the existing board and management team the dissident nominees in last year s or this year s proxy contest, however meritorious it is clear the dissidents have not made a compelling case that change at the board level is warranted ISS therefore recommends shareholders vote on the WHITTE proxy
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management
nominees.
To
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extent
share
price
appreciation
has

growth

in

margins

and

net

income,

one

might

reasonably

conclude

this

is

evidence

the

market

has

bought

into

the

company s

turnaround

strategy

and

its

operating

leadership.

The

income

statement

for

fiscal

2012

strongly

supports

the

company s

view

that

a

real

turnaround

has

taken

root.

It

is worth

pointing

out

that

this isa profoundly silly reason to run a proxy contest, and the amount of attention the dissidents have lavished on it may raise more questions about their sense of perspective than the incoming Chairman s integrity. The critical point,

point,
in
all
the
company s
communications
which
deployed
the
phrase,
is

that
Bradford
has
significant
and
substantial
executive
experience
as
a
leader
an
unchallenged bona fide which might shareholders assessing his ability to lead this company as Chairman
might
appreciate.

and not suggestions of

29
PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS AGREE
VOTE THE WHITE
PROXY CARD
Selected Commentary from Glass Lewis

Source: Proxy Paper report (Glass, Lewis & Co.) dated 2-Nov-2012 Note: Permission to use quotations neither sought nor obtained.

Emphasis added.

With the foregoing factors in mind, we see little reason for shareholders to now support the candidacy of Messrs. Biglari or Cooley, whose own high-level stewardship has failed to generate attractive returns for shareholders of Biglari, despite its relatively

substantial

interest

in

a

rebounding

Cracker

Barrel.

Accordingly,

we

recommend

shareholders

vote

FOR

all

nominees

on

management's

WHITE

proxy

card.

we

now

find

a

materially

improved

Company

operating

under

the

stewardship

of

a

substantially

reconstituted

board

and

management

team

that

has

executed

on

a

well-codified

and

publicly-disclosed

business
plan.
Further
foundering Biglari's most recent solicitation are a series of relatively uncompelling and, at times, specious arguments, which
collectively do little to support a forward operating plan that is decidedly light on detail, despite the Dissident's industry
experience.
Cracker
Barrel
appears
to
have
dramatically
improved
its
financial
performance,
while
also
taking
concrete
steps
to
remediate
or
eliminate
several
outstanding
governance
concerns.
In
response,
we
find
the
Dissident
has
resorted
to
decidedly
less
compelling
quantitative
arguments
and
abrasive
commentary
to
support

a
vaguely-framed
plan
that,
all
other
things
equal,
seems
to
work
against
a
strategy
that
has
objectively
improved returns
and
transparency for
Cracker
Barrel shows ald are
shareholders.
we note the board has already been substantially reconstituted through the appointment of six new independent
we note the board has already been substantially reconstituted through the appointment of six new independent
directors in the last 18 months, and, moreover, several board members with whom we have previously taken issue will no
be
standing
for
reelection
at
the and a second
2012
annual
meeting.
When
taken
together
with
what
we
view
as
a
well-disclosed
business
plan,
we

see little reason to disrupt the current board

dynamic.

BIGLARI HAS ARGUED THAT HE PURCHASED CBRL STOCK FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES ONLY

(1) Biglari Holdings, press release dated 23-Sep-2011.

However, Biglari s Rhetoric Changes Over Time and We Believe Cannot Be Relied Upon we told Chairman Michael

Woodhouse that we have

purchased stock for investment purposes only

Sardar Biglari

1

Our intention was that even if we were to purchase additional stock, we would keep ownership well under 20%.

Sardar Biglari

Current ownership of 17.4% exceeds his previously announced intentions
Biglari has twice attempted to gain board seats to influence the Company not investment purposes only
In September 2012, Biglari Holdings agreed to pay \$850,000 to settle charges that it violated anti-trust rules when it purchased Cracker Barrel shares

31
WHAT SARDAR BIGLARI RECENTLY CONFIRMED ABOUT
BIGLARI HOLDINGS
We,
however,
are
control

investors

1 2 2

Biglari Holdings is an unconventional public company because it is in the business of owning other businesses without regard to any particular industry along with the stipulation that all major capital allocation decisions are made by Sardar Biglari, Chairman and CEO. The logic underlying the dual class structure indicates that we could gain increased flexibility in structuring acquisitions and financing transactions to augment our growth. As a holding company, we believe that the greater flexibility resulting from our proposal would transform into an advantage in our pursuit of other businesses. We may also use such stock to acquire other businesses combinations thereof. Source: Public filings Note: Emphasis added. (1)

Biglari Holdings, 2011 Letter from the Chairman, dated 10-Dec-2011.

Biglari Holdings, Schedule 14A, filed 12-Sep-2012.

WHAT DOES BIGLARI REALLY THINK?

Biglari Holdings is a jockey stock.

You are choosing the jockey; I am choosing the horses.

It

would

be

asinine to bet on the jockey and then deny him the saddle or whip. Source: Public filings (1) Biglari Holdings, 2011 Letter from the Chairman, dated 10-Dec-2011.

OUR VIEWS ON BIGLARI ARE SHARED BY WALL STREET ANALYSTS

Selected Analyst Commentary

Source: Public news sources and publicly available equity research reports, permission to use quotations neither sought nor ob Mr. Biglari s argument seems to be less focused on corporate governance and shareholder performance, which was the basis of last year s proxy fight, and more focused on demanding that as the largest

shareholder he deserves two

Holdings has

seats on Cracker Barrel s board. We are skeptical that the other 82% of Cracker Barrel s shareholders would vote for two executives of a direct competitor, Steak n Shake, to join Cracker Barrel s board. We find it interesting that if you exclude the investment in Cracker Barrel, Biglari

not made many shareholder enhancing decisions the past two years. Assuming the market is reflecting the CBRL investment gain in BH s market valuation, we estimate BH s market value would be down about 10% since it became an active investor in Cracker Barrel on June 13, 2011 (vs. KBCM Restaurant Index +30%). We estimate the **CBRL** investment represents roughly 55% of BH s enterprise value. We expect Biglari Holdings will lose the proxy fight in November. Chris O Cull, KeyBanc Capital Markets; 20-Sep-2012 Mr. Biglari has not issued an alternative strategic plan for **CBRL** but has suggested aggressive goals to drive

```
sales
and
traffic
without
supporting
details
as
to
how
such
results
would
be
realized.
Under
Sandy
Cochran,
who
became
CEO
in
September 2011, the company has performed strongly.
Numerous changes have been implemented ranging from board
composition (much higher quality board in our opinion) to marketing, cost management, and willingness to return cash to
shareholders.
 It
is
not
clear
what
Mr.
Biglari s
plans
might
involve
or
if
they
could
be
as
effective
management s
recent performance.
Joseph T. Buckley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch; 19-Sep-2012
 At this
point
in
```

time

[Biglari] hasn't revealed any plan, of which I'm aware, to the company. think the company wants to make sure if he has designs on taking over this company and its business, they'd like to make sure the shareholders, other than just him, are well taken care of. Bob Derrington, Northcoast Research, as quoted in the San Antonio Express; 18-Oct-2012

Bob Definigion, Northeodast Research, as quoted in the San Antonio Express, 16-Oct-20

OUR VIEWS ON BIGLARI ARE SHARED BY WALL STREET

ANALYSTS (CONT.)

Selected Analyst Commentary

Source: Publicly available equity research reports, permission to use quotations neither sought nor obtained

Whatever

Biglari s

intentions
for
CBRL
still
may
be,
however,
we
continue
to
side
with
management
in
this fight,
as the company already has enacted several measures to boost operational performance (as evidenced
by CBRL s industry-leading comps in family dining), enhance shareholder value (e.g., increased dividend 14% for
FY12, removed operating and corporate-level costs), and improve managerial oversight (e.g., splitting the roles of
CEO
and
Chairman
of
the Description
Board).
We .
surmise
there
will
be
even
less
incentive
for
shareholders
to
side
with a potential Biglari-sponsored slate of Board nominees this November. Although the potential for a
second proxy fight remains, we now think a repeat of last year s contentious fight appears less likely.
-
Stephen
Anderson,
Miller
Tabak;
6-Aug-2012
Mr.
Biglari
has
a
record
of

creeping
takeovers.
Biglari
Holdings
is
essentially
sending
excess
cash
from
Steak
n Chalca
Shake
to the
Lion
Fund.
These
investments
in .
the
Lion
Fund
do
not
appear
in
Biglari
Holdings
balance
sheet due to the requirement to fully consolidate the Lion Fund in BH s financial statements. In addition, the Lion
Fund s portfolio has purchased significant interests in BH common stock, which is classified on BH s balance sheet
as treasury stock, yet the shares remain outstanding. BH s pro-rata ownership of its common stock through Lion
Fund as of June 13, 2012 was roughly 100,000 shares, but the Lion Fund, in total, owns roughly 200,000 shares.
Essentially, Mr. Biglari has voting control of roughly 15% of BH s common stock, but he personally owns
roughly 10,000 shares (0.7%).
We wonder how BH decides between allocating excess cash to the Lion Fund and investing more in Steak
Shake (since Mr. Biglari argues it is doing so well) or just returning it to BH shareholders.
- Shake (since wir. Digital argues it is doing so well) of just returning it to Dif shareholders.
Christopher
O'Cull,
KeyBanc
Capital
Markets;
12-Jul-2012

35
BIGLARI OFTEN STATES HE IS A "CONTROL INVESTOR
BUT WE BELIEVE
YOU SHOULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO TAKE CREEPING CONTROL OF
CRACKER BARREL AS HE DID WITH STEAK 'N SHAKE
Source: Public filings and Bloomberg

(1) Stock price adjusted for reverse split to be comparable to current market price.

(2) As per Biglari's Schedule 13D/A filing on 3-Feb-2010. (3) As per Biglari's preliminary proxy filing on 12-Sep-2012. 17-Aug-2007 Share Price: \$309.00 1 Biglari discloses 5.8% ownership in Steak n Shake Nominates himself and Cooley to the Board 7-Mar-2008 Biglari wins Proxy Contest 19-Jun-2008 Biglari appointed Chairman of the Board Jul-2008 Two executive team members resign 8-Aug-2008 Biglari appointed **CEO** Took control Became Chairman and CEO Merged with Western Sizzlin Renamed Biglari Holdings 22-Oct-2009 Announces Merger with Western Sizzlin 5.8% Ownership Today: Control of 15.5% 3 and CEO **Share Price** (28-Sep-2012) \$365.06 8-Apr-2010 Renamed Biglari Holdings Biglari only controlled 6.8% 2 Purchased

through:

Lion Fund

Western Sizzlin

_

P. Cooley

Call Options:

_

20,000 shares

through Lion

Fund

_

561,000 shares

through Western

Sizzlin

BIGLARI

HOLDINGS

Biglari originally claimed that he had acquired shares for investment purposes

Instead he:

INC.

36 EVEN WITH BIGLARI HOLDINGS LARGE STAKE,

BH HAS

SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERPERFORMED CBRL

CBRL Represents over 50% of BH s Market Cap

Source: Bloomberg and public filings

Note: 12-Sep-2011; is closing price the day prior to announcement of Strategic Priorities on 13-Sep-2011.

What value has Biglari

created for his

shareholders in his own

restaurant business

without CBRL?

37
BIGLARI AGAIN TURNED DOWN A GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT OFFER
Biglari Rejected The Following Settlement Proposal:

Not be affiliated with Biglari Holdings

Not be a current executive officer or director of a competing restaurant company

Comply with CBRL s long-standing publicly disclosed qualification criteria This offer was subject to the minimal conditions that, Biglari Holdings:

Support the Board-recommended slate of nominees at the 2012 annual meeting that would include the two nominees of Biglari Holdings

Not nominate other candidates or present shareholder proposals at the 2012 annual meeting

Not seek to call or support any special meeting prior to the Company s 2013 annual meeting Many proxy fights are settled with the appointment of one or more directors that are not affiliated with the dissident, yet Biglari refuses even to consider nominating an independent director, insisting that is has to be him and Cooley

Does

Mr.

Biglari

really

want

representation

or

simply

a

platform

for

himself?

In voting Biglari down last year, shareholders determined last year he wasn t right for the Board Biglari Holdings was offered two board seats subject only to the reasonable requirements that nominees:

38 ONE THING THAT HAS NOT CHANGED AT BIGLARI HOLDINGS .It s All About Sardar

OUR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLAN IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS AND HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED BY ISS

Source: ISS Proxy Advisory Services report (Institutional Shareholder Services) dated 2-Nov-2012 Our Shareholder-Friendly Rights Plan Protects Shareholders From Biglari s Tactics Adopted in April 2012 in response to threat that Biglari could gain creeping control without paying a control premium

In his 2011 Letter From the Chairman, Biglari said We are control investors when we own a sizeable block of stock engendering influence

Tennessee law preventing shareholders from voting shares above 20% without shareholder approval is not sufficient. By acquiring shares above 20%, Biglari could still prevent other shareholders from voting those shares and gain greater influence by virtue of economic ownership Shareholder-friendly provisions include:

Rights expire if shareholders do not approve rights plan at November 2012 annual meeting

If shareholders approve, rights would expire on April 9, 2015

ISS Recommends A Vote FOR

Our Shareholder Rights Plan

A vote FOR

this proposal is warranted because **the rights plan contains features that protect shareholders** from entrenchment risk.

Specifically, the pill has a three-year term, a 20-percent trigger, and a robust qualifying offer clause and there is no dead-hand or slow-hand provision. In addition, there are no significant governance concerns at the company.

Note: Permission

to

use

quotations

neither

sought

nor

obtained.

Emphasis

added.

Rights plan is focused on creeping acquisitions above 20% and would not be triggered by qualifying offers (all-cash,

fully

financed

tender

offers

that

remain

open

for

at

least

60

business

days)

OTHER SHAREHOLDER MATTERS

Compensation

Pay for Performance Culture

Compensation Committee Review and Revisions of Compensation Practices in 2012

80% of CEO s target total direct 2012 compensation, and 69% of other named executive officers, is contingent upon measurable performance

Edgar Filing: CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC - Form DEFA14A
Incentive programs have one, two and three year performance periods to promote both short and long term appreciation of shareholder value 2012 Total Shareholder Return significantly outperformed the S&P 500, 600, and 1,500 Restaurant indices Revenue growth, improved margins, and strong Return On Invested Capital performance resulted in incentive plan performance in excess of targets Initiated full review of compensation practices based on say-on-pay vote results and feedback from shareholders and proxy advisory services in connection with 2011 annual meeting Instituted a number of revisions to compensation practices as a result of this analysis: Compensation Policies
Revised overall compensation philosophy to target total compensation paid to our executive officers at median of peer group
Revised stock ownership guidelines to multiple of base salary for executive officers and total cash retainer for

5x base salary for CEO

non-employee directors:

3x base salary for CFO and Executive Vice Presidents; 2x base salary for all other executive officers

For non-employee directors, greater of 5,000 shares or 5x the annual cash retainer

No covered persons may sell any shares until threshold is reached

Worked

to

clarify

disclosure

in

CD&A

of

compensation

performance

targets

and

performance

relative

to

them

Adopted anti-hedging policy for officers and directors

WHY YOU SHOULD VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD

We have accomplished a great deal over the last year with more to come

Our reconfigured Board is highly engaged and continuously seeks to create value We believe Biglari s and Cooley s presence would create a conflict of interest and would be detrimental to the functioning of our Board

We again made a good faith offer this year to permit Biglari to appoint two independent directors to the Board and again he rejected. Is his fight about having representation or just about him?

We believe Biglari s historic playbook of creeping control and poor corporate governance could harm Cracker Barrel and its shareholders

Appendix

RECONCILIATION OF GAAP BASIS OPERATING RESULTS

TO ADJUSTED NON-GAAP OPERATING RESULTS

- (Unaudited and \$ in thousands, except per share data)
- (1) Severance, other charges and tax effects related to operational restructuring.
- (2) (Charges) Gain and tax effects of impairment net of gain on sale of property.
- (3) Refinancing costs and tax effects related to the Company's \$750 million credit facility.

(4) Charges and tax effects of the proxy contest concluded at the Company's annual meeting of shareholders. Fourth Quarter Ended August 3, 2012 Fourth Quarter Ended July 29, 2011 As Reported Adjust 53rd Week As Adjusted As Reported Adjust 1,2,3,4 As Adjusted Total Revenue \$ 700,010 (51,059)\$ 648,951 \$ 612,942 \$ 612,942 Store Operating Income 97,577 (11,093)86,484 74,660 74,660 General and Administrative Expenses 37,671 (1,370)36,301 35,323 (2,172)33,151 Impairment and Store Dispositions, Net 1,249 (1,044)205 Operating Income 59,906 (9,723)50,183 38,088 3,216 41,304

Interest Expense

```
11,354
(811)
10,543
16,327
(5,136)
11,191
Pretax Income
48,552
(8,912)
39,640
21,761
8,352
30,113
Provision for Income Tax
13,856
(2,632)
11,224
4,218
2,201
6,419
Net Income
$ 34,696
$ (6,280)
$ 28,416
$ 17,543
$ 6,151
$ 23,694
Earning Per Share
Basic
$ 1.49
(0.27)
$ 1.22
$ 0.77
$ 0.27
$ 1.04
Earning Per Share
Diluted
$ 1.47
(0.27)
$ 1.20
$ 0.75
$ 0.26
$ 1.01
Twelve Months Ended August 3, 2012
```

Twelve Months Ended July 29, 2011

As Reported Adjust

205

190,975 6,863 (9,723) 188,115 167,181 1,342 168,523

Operating Income

Interest Expense

44,687

1,4 53rd Week As Adjusted As Reported Adjust 1,2,3,4 As Adjusted Total Revenue \$ 2,580,195 (51,059)\$ 2,529,136 \$ 2,434,435 \$ 2,434,435 Store Operating Income 337,146 (11,093)326,053 305,778 305,778 General and Administrative Expenses 146,171 (6,863)(1,370)137,938 139,222 (2,172)137,050 Impairment and Store Dispositions, Net (625)830

110

(811)43,876 51,490 (5,136)46,354 Pretax Income 146,288 6,863 (8,912)144,239 115,691 6,478 122,169 Provision for Income Tax 43,207 2,027 (2,632)42,602 30,483 1,707 32,190 Net Income \$ 103,081 \$4,836 \$ (6,280) \$ 101,637 \$ 85,208 \$4,771 \$89,979 Earning Per Share Basic \$ 4.47 \$ 0.21 (0.27)\$ 4.41 \$ 3.70 \$ 0.21 \$ 3.91 Earning Per Share Diluted \$ 4.40 \$ 0.21 (0.27)\$ 4.34 \$ 3.61

\$ 0.20 \$ 3.81

44
A NOTE REGARDING PEER SET USED FOR BENCHMARKING Last year our peer set included:

Biglari Holdings, Brinker International, Cheesecake Factory, Darden Restaurants, P.F. Chang s China Bistro, Ruby Tuesday, and

Texas Roadhouse

During the past year P.F. Chang s China Bistro was acquired by Centerbridge Partners and is no longer publicly traded

Based on feedback received we have added Bob Evans Farms and Denny s Corporation both full-service restaurants chains We believe this subset of casual and family dining restaurants represents the most comparable set of companies to benchmark CBRL performance

Leading casual / family dining concepts

Operational comparability

Similar scale

Geographical proximity

Rationale for Inclusion

Peer Set

Ticker

Company Name

Logo

BH

Biglari Holdings

BOBE

Bob Evans Farms

EAT

Brinker International

CAKE

The Cheesecake Factory

DRI

Darden Restaurants

DENN

Denny s Corporation

RT

Ruby Tuesday

TXRH

Texas Roadhouse

45
S&P RESTAURANT INDEX COMPOSITION
Respective S&P Restaurant Index Constituents
Ticker
Company Name
Logo
S&P

500 S&P 600 S&P 1,500 **BJRI** BJ s Restaurants BH Biglari Holdings **BOBE Bob Evans Farms BWLD** Buffalo Wild Wings **CAKE** The Cheesecake Factory **CBRL** Cracker Barrel Old Country Store **CEC CEC** Entertainment **CMG** Chipotle Mexican Grill DIN DineEquity DRI Darden Restaurants **EAT Brinker International JACK** Jack in the Box Ticker Company Name Logo S&P 500 S&P 600 S&P 1,500 **MCD** McDonald s PEET Peet s Coffee & Tea **PNRA** Panera Bread Company **PZZA** Papa John s International **RRGB** Red Robin Gourmet Burgers RTRuby Tuesday

RUTH

Ruth s Hospitality Group

SBUX

Starbucks

SONC

Sonic

TXRH

Texas Roadhouse

WEN

The Wendy s Company

YUM

Yum! Brands

Post Office Box 787

LEBANON, TENNESSEE

37088-0787

Investor Contact: Lawrence E. Hyatt, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

(615) 235-4432

Mark Harnett, MacKenzie Partners, Inc.

(212) 929-5877

Media Contact: Julie K. Davis, Senior Director, Corporate Communications

(615) 443-9266

Ruth Pachman, Kekst and Company

(212) 521-4891

CRACKER BARREL URGES SHAREHOLDERS TO PROTECT THE FUTURE OF THEIR

INVESTMENT BY SUPPORTING ONGOING BUSINESS SUCCESS

Asks For YES Votes on All Board Nominees at Annual Meeting Next Week, as Recommended by ISS and Glass Lewis

Urges Approval of Shareholder-Friendly Rights Plan Endorsed by ISS

LEBANON, Tenn. November 6, 2012 Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (Cracker Barrel or the Company) (Nasdaq: CBRL) today sent a letter to shareholders from Sandra B. Cochran, President and Chief Executive Officer, urging them to protect the future of their investment by supporting the Company s ongoing business success and preventing Sardar Biglari from taking creeping control without paying shareholders a premium.

Ms. Cochran asked shareholders to approve all Board nominees at the Company s annual meeting on November 15, 2012, in line with recommendations of leading independent proxy advisory services Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co. She also urged approval of the Company s shareholder-friendly rights plan, which was also endorsed by ISS.

We believe that Mr. Biglari has used unnecessarily divisive rhetoric, and has cherry-picked unfavorable data points of questionable relevance in an effort to distract from our successes over the past year, Ms. Cochran stated. We further believe that his presence on our Board would risk derailing our success and interfere with the Board's ongoing effectiveness.

She emphasized the importance of shareholders voting for the Shareholder Rights Plan, which was designed to prevent Mr. Biglari or anyone else from gaining creeping control of Cracker Barrel without paying shareholders a premium, while retaining several shareholder-friendly provisions.

- MORE -

Page 2

She concluded: We believe that change at the Board level is not warranted at this time, and we are pleased that ISS and Glass Lewis recognize our successful business execution over the past year, as well as the lack of foundation for Mr. Biglari s arguments. We urge you to protect your investment and support all ten of your Board s nominees.

Text of Letter from Ms. Cochran to Cracker Barrel Shareholders:

PROTECT THE FUTURE OF YOUR INVESTMENT AND SUPPORT YOUR

COMPANY S ONGOING BUSINESS SUCCESS

Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Agree: Reject Biglari and Cooley for Board Seats;

Vote FOR Cracker Barrel s Highly Qualified Board Slate

ISS Recommends Voting **FOR** Shareholder Rights Plan;

Prevent Biglari from Taking Creeping Control of Your Company

VOTE THE ENCLOSED WHITE PROXY CARD TODAY

November 6, 2012

Dear Cracker Barrel Shareholders:

At Cracker Barrel s November 15, 2012 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, you will have an important decision to make regarding the future of your investment. By supporting your Board-designated nominees, you will be able to reaffirm your support for our ongoing commitment to generating value for shareholders.

As you review the large amount of correspondence generated thus far, we encourage you to consider the following key facts: we have successfully executed on the strategic initiatives we announced last year; we had strong financial and operational performance during our 2012 fiscal year; we have added new perspectives, skills and expertise to our Board through seven new directors over the past 18 months; and we have added key senior management hires in areas vital to our organization.

Our accomplishments across multiple operational and financial metrics have translated into not only improvements in sales, operating margins and earnings per share, but also a 68.4% appreciation in the value of the Company s shares in the year following the announcement of our strategic initiatives. Since launching our strategic priorities in September 2011, we have:

Outperformed the S&P 500 Restaurant Index, S&P 600 Restaurant Index, S&P 1500 Restaurant Index, S&P 500 Index, and the peer set delineated in our 2012 proxy statement;

Doubled our quarterly dividend from \$0.25 to \$0.50, thereby increasing our dividend yield to 3%;

From September 12, 2011, the day prior to announcement of our six strategic priorities, through September 28, 2012.

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Increased cash and cash equivalent balances by nearly \$100 million, or 190%;

Achieved operating margin expansion of 50 bps for FY 2012;

Accelerated same store sales growth in the last three quarters; and

Outperformed casual dining peers in same store traffic and sales growth for three consecutive quarters, as measured by the Knapp-TrackTM casual dining index.

Mr. Biglari has distributed materials that attempt to dispute these facts and distract you from our operational and financial success, recruitment of new Board members and positive ongoing momentum. However, we believe he has failed to contribute any new meaningful or original ideas, and has made assertions about our performance and governance that we believe are, at best, uninformed, and, at worst, intentionally misleading. For example, Mr. Biglari has asserted that we changed the formula used to calculate ROIC for purposes of executive compensation. This is incorrect. As noted by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) in its report: Contrary to assertions by the dissidents, the formula used to calculate ROIC in the executive incentive plans is unchanged from the one the board adopted in fiscal 2011, when it introduced the metric for executive compensation plans.² In its report, Glass Lewis & Co. noted that Mr. Biglari s most recent solicitation includes a series of uncompelling and, at times, specious arguments.

We believe that Mr. Biglari has used unnecessarily divisive rhetoric, and has cherry-picked unfavorable data points of questionable relevance in an effort to distract from our successes over the past year. We further believe that his presence on our Board would risk derailing our success and interfere with the Board s ongoing effectiveness.

We firmly stand behind the qualifications of our Board, and remain confident that we have the right members in place to drive continued execution of our strategic plan. In addition, our nominees have received the unequivocal endorsement of two leading proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, both of which recommend that you reject the nominations of Mr. Biglari and Mr. Cooley to our Board.

In its recommendation to support Cracker Barrel s slate of nominees, ISS states: As the most compelling explanation of the company s resurgence is the leadership change and execution on the new strategic plan by the existing board and management team-and not suggestions of the dissident nominees in last year s or this year s proxy contest, however meritorious it is clear the dissidents have not made a compelling case that change at the board level is warranted. ISS therefore recommends shareholders vote on the WHITE proxy card FOR the management nominees.

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Permission to use quotes from the ISS report or the Glass Lewis report neither sought nor obtained.

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ISS also recommends that shareholders vote FOR the Company s Shareholder Rights Plan, which was designed to prevent investors like Mr. Biglari, or anyone else, from gaining creeping control of Cracker Barrel without paying our shareholders a premium while retaining several shareholder-friendly provisions. In recommending that you vote in favor of the Shareholder Rights Plan, ISS states: A vote FOR this proposal is warranted because the rights plan contains features that protect shareholders from entrenchment risk. Specifically, the pill has a three-year term, a 20-percent trigger, and a robust qualifying offer clause and there is no dead-hand or slow-hand provision. In addition, there are no significant governance concerns at the company.

In sum, we believe that change at the Board level is not warranted at this time, and we are pleased that ISS and Glass Lewis recognize our successful business execution over the past year, as well as the lack of foundation for Mr. Biglari s arguments. We urge you to protect your investment and support all ten of your Board s nominees.

To support your Board, vote the enclosed WHITE card and vote FOR ALL of the Company s nominees to the Board and FOR the Company s Shareholder Rights Plan. To ensure that your vote is received in time, vote by telephone or Internet by following the instructions on the Company s WHITE card. We urge you NOT to sign any gold proxy card sent to you by Mr. Biglari. Even a withhold vote for Mr. Biglari and Mr. Cooley on his gold proxy card will cancel any previous proxy that you previously submitted to vote FOR ALL the Company s nominees as it is only the latest dated proxy card that will be counted at the shareholder meeting.

If you have any questions or require assistance with voting your WHITE proxy card, please call MacKenzie Partners, Inc., toll-free, at (800) 322-2885.

Sincerely,

Sandra B. Cochran

President and Chief Executive Officer

About Cracker Barrel

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store restaurants provide a friendly home-away-from-home in their old country stores and restaurants. Guests are cared for like family while relaxing and enjoying real home-style food and shopping that surprisingly unique, genuinely fun and reminiscent of America sucuntry heritage all at a fair price. The restaurant serves up delicious, home-style country food such as meatloaf and homemade chicken number dumplins as well as its signature biscuits using an old family recipe. The authentic old country retail store is fun to shop and offers unique gifts and self-indulgences.

Headquartered in Lebanon, Tennessee, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (Nasdaq: CBRL) was established in 1969 and operates 621 company-owned locations in 42 states. Every Cracker Barrel unit is open seven days a week with hours Sunday through Thursday, 6 a.m. 10 p.m., and Friday and Saturday, 6 a.m. - 11 p.m. For more information, visit: <u>crackerbarrel.com</u>.

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IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Cracker Barrel, its directors and certain of its executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders in connection with the matters to be considered at Cracker Barrel s 2012 Annual Meeting. On October 4, 2012, Cracker Barrel filed a definitive proxy statement (as it may be amended, the Proxy Statement) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in connection with any such solicitation of proxies from Cracker Barrel shareholders. INVESTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO READ THE PROXY STATEMENT AND ACCOMPANYING PROXY CARD AND OTHER DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE SEC CAREFULLY AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE AS THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION. Detailed information regarding the identity of potential participants, and their direct or indirect interests, by security holdings or otherwise, is set forth in the Proxy Statement, including Annex A thereto. Shareholders can obtain the Proxy Statement, any amendments or supplements to the Proxy Statement and other documents filed by Cracker Barrel with the SEC for no charge at the SEC s website at www.sec.gov. Copies will also be available at no charge at the Investor Relations section of our corporate website at www.crackerbarrel.com.

CBRL-F

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (the Company) sent the following letter to shareholders of the Company in a mailing commenced on November 6, 2012. This letter was also posted to the Proxy Contest section of the Company's Investor Relations website, investor.crackerbarrel.com.

PROTECT THE FUTURE OF YOUR INVESTMENT AND SUPPORT YOUR

COMPANY S ONGOING BUSINESS SUCCESS

Leading Proxy Advisory Firms Agree: Reject Biglari and Cooley for Board Seats;

Vote FOR Cracker Barrel s Highly Qualified Board Slate

ISS Recommends Voting FOR Shareholder Rights Plan;

Prevent Biglari from Taking Creeping Control of Your Company

VOTE THE ENCLOSED WHITE PROXY CARD TODAY

November 6, 2012

Dear Cracker Barrel Shareholders:

At Cracker Barrel s November 15, 2012 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, you will have an important decision to make regarding the future of your investment. By supporting your Board-designated nominees, you will be able to reaffirm your support for our ongoing commitment to generating value for shareholders.

As you review the large amount of correspondence generated thus far, we encourage you to consider the following key facts: we have successfully executed on the strategic initiatives we announced last year; we had strong financial and operational performance during our 2012 fiscal year; we have added new perspectives, skills and expertise to our Board through seven new directors over the past 18 months; and we have added key senior management hires in areas vital to our organization.

Our accomplishments across multiple operational and financial metrics have translated into not only improvements in sales, operating margins and earnings per share, but also a 68.4% appreciation in the value of the Company s shares in the year following the announcement of our strategic initiatives. Since launching our strategic priorities in September 2011, we have:

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If you have any questions, require assistance with voting your WHITE proxy card,

or need additional copies of the proxy materials, please contact:

105 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016

cbrlproxy@mackenziepartners.com

(212) 929-5500 (Call Collect) Or TOLL-FREE (800) 322-2885